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there is some evidence of an emerging international presence), and the security personnel of 
companies engaged in the natural resources industry. This has led to serious human rights 
violations of indigenous peoples and other local inhabitants, who often find themselves 
entangled in protracted conflicts with multinational companies over access to their land. Two 
case studies involving fieldwork in the logging and palm oil sectors in Sumatra reveal a 
pernicious and deliberate erosion and violation of rights of local inhabitants across the 
spectrum of security actors, showing that public security actors are protecting corporate 
interests rather than performing public functions. The implications of these findings are 
considered in terms of legal responsibilities as well as access to justice. The article reasons 
towards what are argued to be necessary legal and policy changes.    
 
Keywords accountability, corporate capture, corporate-community conflict, human rights, 
Indonesia, land rights, logging, private military and security companies, natural resources 





There have been widespread human rights violations across the Indonesian archipelago by the 
Indonesian security sector working for or on behalf of multinational corporations (MNCs) in 
the commodities sector. Media, NGO and IGO reports, referred to in the course of this article, 
point to a range of human rights violations such as land grabbing, forcible eviction, denial of 
customary land rights, murder, torture, sexual violence, assault, intimidation, arbitrary arrest 
and illegal detention. These human rights violations have been perpetrated by members of the 
Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)), members of the 
Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia (Polri)), especially the 
Mobile Brigade Corps (Korps Brigade Mobil (Brimob)), as well as local private security 
guards and militia, often directly linked to the MNCs involved. Successive government 
policy on land and natural resources has exacerbated the problem combined with the 
influence of the military and its links to the business sector, both of which have made matters 
more complex.  
 
Military involvement in the economic and political life of the country is intertwined with the 
history of the country since its independence, especially the New Order administration (1966-
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1998), when the military were rewarded with political and business opportunities for 
supporting President Suharto’s economic development policies.1 Suharto cultivated 
relationships with MNCs for the commercial exploitation of natural resources while the 
military and police seized lands from local communities using violence and intimidation.2 
Payments were made to the military and police for security services to MNCs, including the 
high profile companies Exxon Mobil and Freeport-McMoRan.3 Despite reforms in the 
reformasi era following the fall of Suharto in the aftermath of Asian Financial Crisis (1997-
1998),4 the military and police continued to provide security to MNCs up to the present day 
with little regard for the human rights of local communities under government land policy.5 
Democratic reforms have mainly addressed the military’s political role with limited reform of 
its business interests and commercial security practices.6 Increasing tension between the 
police and military, as a result of government reforms to try and separate state security actors 
from their business interests, have contributed to rising instability in the region and the 
emergence of private security actors.7  
 
The aim of this article is to explore the relationships between security actors and businesses 
especially in the natural resources sector in Indonesia within the normative framework 
provided by international law and processes. Rather than a straightforward application of law 
to the facts, complex and disputed as they are, the article proceeds from a critical basis about 
the inability of international law and institutions to provide a workable framework for the 
regulation of both public and private security actors within a developing state where authority 
and sovereignty, and the line between what is public and private, are difficult to locate. The 
article unearths the reasons behind this failure of international law, to identify the extent of 
abuse of individuals within communities affected by natural resources exploitation and the 
impunity of security actors for such abuse, and provides suggestions for the improved traction 
of law and increased accountability of security actors.  
 
                                                          
1 Crouch (1979), p. 577. 
2 Human Rights Watch (2003), pp. 12-14, 33-34.  
3 Human Rights Watch  (2006), pp. 45-56, 133; Down to Earth (2001);  Global Witness (2005); Yunanto (2006), 
p. 51; Clarke (2008), p. 9.  
4 Heiduk (2014), p. 304. 
5 Human Rights Watch (2010), pp. 3-6. 
6 Ibid., pp. 8-13; Kingsbury (2012), p. 11; Nani (2015). 
7 Human Rights Watch (2006), pp. 66-70; Liss (2014), chapter 7; Sciascia (2013), p. 178. 
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As well as doctrinal legal analysis exposing the difficulties in application of the various 
international legal regimes, centred on international human rights law, the study combines 
documented human rights abuse at the hands of security actors with two case studies on palm 
oil and logging in specific areas of Indonesia. The case studies were undertaken to unearth 
the day-to-day reality of communities living with large scale natural resources exploitation, 
and to illustrate the levels of accountability for infractions of their rights. Qualitative 
techniques were used in the fieldwork, whereby the main corpus of data was gained by 
conducting in-depth interviews with the stakeholders on experiences, practices and 
perspectives on company security. Aside from in-depth interviews, focus group discussions 
were also used as data collection techniques in order to obtain a fuller picture through the 
involvement of various resource persons. The data collection process was guided by 
questions concerning business practices, human rights, and social and environmental impacts. 
The guiding questions were designed before the research team visited the field and were 
further developed throughout the research process. A snow ball sampling method was used 
for the process of collecting data and finding relevant resource persons, in order to build trust 
among the interviewed resource persons and because the issues related to security were 
considered to be sensitive. As a consequence, the research had to rely on the role of 
gatekeepers who could facilitate the meetings between researchers and resource persons.  
 
In terms of the structure of the article, section 2 establishes the principal applicable 
international legal framework within which the actions of security actors can be judged – 
international human rights law - to show that Indonesia has obligations, and also that human 
rights bodies have repeatedly criticised the behaviour of Indonesian security forces, but have 
failed to fully understand the nature of security in that country. Section 3 explores the 
difficulties in establishing the responsibility of the Indonesian state for human rights abuses 
due to the blurring of public and private security in Indonesia, while section 4 deepens this 
analysis though the lens of ‘state capture’ whereby powerful interest groups from the military 
and business have seized the regulatory agenda for their own ends. The efforts of the 
international community to reign in the activities of private security actors are shown in 
section 5 to be inadequate in the case of Indonesia as they are clearly focused on the Western 
model of outsourcing and not on the endemic blurring of public and private actors in 
developing countries such as Indonesia. Section 6 then explores in greater depth the 
relationship between business and security in Indonesia and the national laws that govern it, 
and engages with some of the softer forms of international regulation, which seem better 
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designed to tackle the reality of the intertwined nature of the relationship, but ultimately are 
shown to fall short of this. This is driven home in section 7 which presents clear evidence of 
persistent, pernicious and largely unpunished human rights abuse of villagers and 
communities by a combination of military, police and private security actors all working in 
one way or another for businesses engaged in the natural resources sector. This is done 
through collecting evidence from publicly available sources and then in sections 8 and 9 
through the case studies on palm oil and logging mentioned above. These sectors and case 
studies best illustrate the abuse that occurs at the source of production, away from the eyes of 
the media and civil society, involving communities who are isolated and struggling to survive 
within areas occupied by palm oil and timber producers. Evidence of legal responsibility of 
any sort – governmental, corporate or individual – for such abuse is exposed in section 10, 
which shows the limited accountability of security actors who have committed serious abuses 
and the lack of access to justice for victims of such abuse. Section 11 concludes the article 
with a summary of the findings and recommendations for the future. 
 
 
2. Indonesia, Human Rights and Security 
 
In terms of human rights compliance by Indonesia, there is certainly an upward trend in 
ratification of the key treaties,  namely the International Convention on the Elimination of all 
Racial Discrimination 1966 (Indonesia became a party in 1999); the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 (party in 2006), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966 (party in 2006), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 1979 (party in 1984); 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1984 (party in 1998); Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (party in 
1990); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families 1990 (party in 2012); and the Convention of the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 2006 (party in 2011).   
 
In the main, its reservations and declarations to these treaties have been concerned with 
dispute resolution and self-determination and are designed to protect the territorial integrity 
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of the whole of Indonesia.8 However, Indonesia has not accepted any individual complaints 
mechanisms that may be attached or included in any of the above treaties, meaning that 
individuals who allege human rights abuse do not have any direct access to international 
human rights bodies.9 This is clearly more effective for Indonesia in restricting international-
level accountability for violations than any reservation to the main treaties. Neighbouring 
Philippines, for example, is a country that has accepted the individual complaints 
mechanisms under both the ICCPR in 1989 and CEDAW in 2003, and has been the subject of 
complaints that not only highlight the human rights record of the government but put pressure 
on it to improve and reform its protection of human rights.  
 
As regards a review of Indonesia’s record by treaty-based human rights bodies, the fact that 
Indonesia has only ratified the main human rights treaties relatively recently (ICCPR and 
ICESCR in 2006), has meant that it has gone through a limited number of reporting rounds. 
This provides for some degree of accountability, but a review of these reports with particular 
focus on the Committees’ criticism of Indonesia’s public and private security forces and the 
role of private businesses in Indonesia, shows that it is quite limited. The reporting process is 
an iterative one but the baseline reports should at least address fundamental problems such as 
the provision of security by a state, arguably its raison d’être, and ensuring that state security 
actors do not violate citizens’ rights – a basic negative obligation; and the prevention of 
human rights abuse by private actors – a basic positive obligation. 
 
An overview of reports on Indonesia by the various treaty Committees shows significant 
concern and condemnation of the actions of Indonesian security forces and other issues 
relevant to this study. In 2002, the Committee against Torture welcomed the ‘formal 
separation of the police from the military in 1999, as a vital aspect of the effort to ensure an 
independent civilian authority responsible for maintaining law and order’.10 Nonetheless, it 
was concerned about: ‘the large number of allegations of acts of torture and ill-treatment 
committed by members of the police forces, especially the mobile police units (“Brimob”), 
the army (TNI), and paramilitary groups reportedly linked to authorities, and in areas of 
armed conflict (Aceh, Papua, Maluku, etc.)’; ‘allegations that paramilitary groups, reported to 
                                                          
8 See recommendations in Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Indonesia, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/21/7 (5 July 2012), adopted by the Human Rights Council in Decision 21/105 (19 September 2012).  
9 While Indonesia has not declared its acceptance of the individual complaints mechanisms under Article 22 
CAT 1984, it did accept the inquiry procedure under Article 20 in 1998. Indonesia has signed the optional 
protocol to CEDAW in 2000 but has not ratified it. 
10 UN Doc. A/57/44 (2002), para. 41. 
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be perpetrators of torture and ill-treatment in Indonesia, are supported by some parts of the 
military, and sometimes reportedly are joined by military personnel’; and ‘allegations that 
human rights abuses related to the Convention are sometimes committed by military 
personnel employed by businesses in Indonesia to protect their premises and to avoid labour 
disputes’.11  
 
In 2008, the Committee against Torture expressed deep concern ‘about numerous, ongoing 
credible and consistent allegations, corroborated by the report of the Special Rapporteur on 
torture and other sources, of the routine and disproportionate use of force and widespread 
torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment by members of the 
security and police forces, including by members of the armed forces, mobile police units 
(“Brimob”) and paramilitary groups during military and “sweep” operations, especially in 
Papua, Aceh and in other provinces where there have been armed conflicts’.12 
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination reported in 2007 concern ‘about 
the plan to establish oil palm plantations over some 850 kilometres along the Indonesia-
Malaysia border in Kalimantan as part of the Kalimantan Border Oil Palm Mega-project, and 
the threat this constitutes to the rights of indigenous peoples to own their lands and enjoy 
their culture’. It noted with deep concern ‘reports according to which a high number of 
conflicts arise each year throughout Indonesia between local communities and palm oil 
companies’.13 
 
In 2012 the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women expressed deep 
concern ‘that sexual violence, especially rape, has reportedly been a recurring form of 
violence against women during conflict, including the events of 1965, the 1974-1999 conflict 
in the then East Timor Province, the May 1998 riots, the conflict in Aceh Province, the 
deployment of security and defence forces in Maluku Province and Poso (Central Sulawesi 
Province) and the conflicts in East Java and Papua Provinces’.14 
 
In 2013 the Human Rights Committee expressed concern ‘at increased reports of excessive 
use of force and extrajudicial killings by the police and the military during protests, 
                                                          
11 Ibid., para. 42. 
12 UN Doc. CAT/C/IDN/CO/2 (2 July 2008), para. 11. 
13 UN Doc. A/62/18 (2007) para. 359. 
14 UN Doc. CEDAW/C/IDN/CO/6-7 (7 August 2012), paras. 27-28.  
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particularly in West Papua, Bima and West Nusa Tenggara. The Committee was particularly 
concerned at reports that the State party uses its security apparatus to punish political 
dissidents and human rights defenders. The Committee was also concerned that the National 
Police Commission, which is mandated to receive public complaints against law enforcement 
personnel, [was] weak as it [had] neither powers to summon law enforcement personnel nor 
the mandate to conduct independent investigations’.15 
 
In 2014 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed concern ‘at 
violations of human rights in the mining and plantations sectors, including the right to 
livelihood, the right to food, the right to water, labour rights and cultural rights’; and ‘at the 
lack of an adequate monitoring of the human rights and environmental impact of extractive 
projects during their implementation. In many cases, affected communities have not been 
afforded effective remedies and have, along with human rights defenders working on these 
cases, been subject to violence and persecution. Furthermore, it was concerned that these 
projects have not brought about tangible benefits for local communities’.16 
 
Examining these reports it is relatively clear that Indonesia has a history of serious human 
rights abuse by its state security forces, police and military, some of which is due to the 
number of actual armed conflicts and separatist wars fought on its territory. However, in 
more recent times, in the absence of armed conflict, such conduct can only be analysed in 
human rights terms as violations of rights to life, freedom from torture, and to basic socio-
economic rights to food, water and shelter of individuals and groups who are not engaged in 
conflict against the state,17 which state security forces have perpetrated or helped to 
perpetrate. While the reports point to the involvement of militias and armed groups in such 
violations, the instigator and potential ‘backer’ have often been state security forces.18  
 
A partial explanation for this could be the close relationship enjoyed between state security 
forces and militia, such as Hansip and Wanra, which are regarded as being under the 
                                                          
15 UN Doc. CCPR/C/IDN/CO/1 (21 August 2013), para. 16.  
16 UN Doc. E/C.12/IDN/CO/1 (19 June 2014), paras. 27-9.  
17 Institute of Ecosoc Rights, Dayak Culture Institute (Lebbaga Kebudayaan Dayak, LKD) and the Commission 
for Justice, Peace, and Integrity of Creation (JPIC) SVD Central Kalimantan (2013).  
18 See also Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.3 (21 January 
1999), paras. 40, 44, 56-7, 61, 69, 107; The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.2 (12 August 1999), paras. 48-9; the Representative of the Secretary General on Internally 
Displaced Persons UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/95/Add.2 (15 February 2002), paras. 10, 19, 30, 54, 62.      
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command and authority of state security forces.19 Other militia, however, established by 
companies (such as Pam Swakarsa by Asia Pulp and Paper) and religious/political militia 
(such as the Islamic militia, Laskar Jihad, and the Christian militia, Laskar Kristus) are 
independent civilian groups not under military or police command.20 Given that militia and 
armed groups are widely implicated in human rights violations against local communities, it 
would have been helpful for the Treaty Committees to have paid more attention to the 
problem of these ‘private actors’, and their relationship to ‘public’ authorities.  
 
The picture gained from the above reports is one of a ‘militarized state’, where the focus of 
human rights review by UN bodies and agents has been on the abuse of civilians at the hands 
of state security, with substantial evidence of this occurring in the context of the exploitation 
of natural resources, including palm oil plantations. Again there is limited evidence in these 
reports of the involvement of private security actors, though the role of private companies is 
becoming more evident as the power of the state is gradually rolled back. There remains 
much blurring, however, between public and private actors especially in the field of security. 
 
 
3. Public-Private Distinctions and the Rise of ‘Corporate Capture’ 
 
In liberal thought the public-private distinction relates to the spheres of public and private 
life, whereby the state should not interfere in the private realm.21 In legal terms, literature is 
dominated by ‘western legal classifications of public law, which concerns the state, and 
private law, and which regulates relationships between individuals’.22 This classification 
almost immediately demonstrates a problem as to whether a transaction between a state and a 
private actor, for example a private security contractor, belongs to the realm of public law or 
private law. Turning to international law, traditionally referred to as ‘public’ international 
law, Hilary Charlesworth has written that ‘international law operates in the most public of all 
public worlds, that of nation states’.23 
 
                                                          
19 Beittinger-Lee (2010), p. 172.  
20 Human Rights Watch (2003). See also Bakker (2017). 
21 Mill (1859). 
22 Charlesworth (1988-1989), p. 191. 
23 Ibid., p. 194. 
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Orthodox doctrine in international law states that conduct can constitute a ‘public’ act of state 
if one of three tests is satisfied: that it is performed by organs or agents of the state; that the 
conduct itself is inherently governmental; or if the state is in effective control of such 
conduct.24 These tests arguably fail to understand how many post-modern states currently 
operate. For example, in the UK, numerous functions that were traditionally performed by 
organs and employees of the state, such as the running of prisons, prisoner escort, and 
protection services, are outsourced to private companies.25  
 
Furthermore, in such states, there may be greater outsourcing and privatisation in some areas 
of public life such as security, than in others, such as health or education. Different speeds of 
outsourcing are reflective of what is achievable politically and ideologically, rather than what 
is legally or ethically acceptable. The number of state organs and agents are reduced and 
there is little sense of what is ‘inherently governmental’. In effect outsourcing is a redrawing, 
or at least a blurring, of what constitute inherent state functions and, in areas in which 
outsourcing is deeply entrenched, the government is no longer in effective control of the 
conduct of private companies. This means that it becomes very difficult to label some type of 
conduct as an ‘act of state’ for which the government is legally responsible.  
 
Moral objections to the reduction of a state’s inherently governmental functions can be made 
on the basis, for instance, that even a minimal liberal state should provide security and not 
contract it out as this may lead to some citizens, or areas within a state, not being covered by 
security arrangements.26 However, the fact remains that governmental hollowing out has 
clearly occurred in some Western states such as the US.27 This has resulted in a reduction in 
democratic accountability, for instance whereby democratically elected governments pay less 
attention to the loss of life of private military or security personnel in contrast to the loss of 
regular soldiers. It also corresponds to an increase of corporate influence on some 
governments.28 In some cases this extends to a situation of ‘corporate capture’ (discussed 
below) whereby ‘an economic elite undermines the realization of human rights and the 
                                                          
24 Articles 4, 5 and 8, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001. 
25 Jones and Newburn (2005). 
26 Nozick (1974), p. 113. 
27 Stanger (2009).  
28 Ibid., p. ix. 
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environment by exerting undue influence over domestic and international decision-makers 
and public institutions’.29 
 
Yet, despite these developments in key Western states, which have frequently been mimicked 
in developing countries, often with outright encouragement by Western states and global 
financial institutions,30 the prevailing orthodox view of the public-private distinction as found 
in international law is very much based on the concept of a strong sovereign state, one that 
retains a firm grip, if not monopoly, on the use of force. Although such states clearly still 
exist, international legal doctrine has failed to adapt to the increasing variety of modern, post-
modern, and also pre-modern states.  
 
In this vein, Neil Walker has cogently argued that within the European Union at least, a post-
Westphalian phase of sovereignty - what he labels as ‘late sovereignty’ - has been reached. In 
this phase, sovereignty is ‘no longer so widely or so confidently conceived of as part of the 
meta-language of explanation and political language’; rather it is ‘about a plausible and 
reasonably effective claim to ultimate authority’. Thus it should be possible to ‘imagine 
ultimate authority, or sovereignty, in non-exclusive terms’.31  
 
Unsurprisingly, Western states continue to support the orthodox tests for state responsibility 
since they effectively allow them to outsource their responsibility as well as their functions. 
In contrast, when it comes to developing states, the story of when conduct is an act of state 
and when it is a private act follows a different path. In the context of colonialism and 
decolonisation, Antony Anghie has argued that the ‘acquisition of sovereignty by the Third 
World was an extraordinarily significant event; and yet, various limitations and disadvantages 
appeared to be somehow peculiarly connected with that sovereignty’.32 Anghie’s compelling 
thesis is that sovereignty in the Westphalian sense was not simply extended from European 
states to newly decolonized states; rather, colonialism helped to shape a new form of 
                                                          
29 ‘Corporate capture’ as defined by the Corporate Capture Project of the ESCR-Net Corporate Accountability 
Working Group, at https://www.escr-net.org/corporateaccountability/corporatecapture (accessed 5 July 2018), 
which has made submissions to the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). The 
CESCR has recently adopted General Comment No. 24 (2017) on state obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 
(10 August 2017). 
30 Estrin and Pelletier (2015).  
31 Walker (2003), pp.17-23.  
32 Anghie (2004), p. 2. 
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sovereignty for this new wave of independent states, one that is ‘rendered uniquely 
vulnerable and dependent by international law’.33  
 
The embedded nature of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty signifies that its influence 
persists in core areas such as state responsibility, but this does not match the reality of 
developing countries. For developing states, like Indonesia, sovereignty is something that has 
to be continuously fought for and consolidated as the scope and depth of state control 
fluctuates, with state organs and non-state actors constantly redefining what is public and 
what is private.  It is not so much states giving up their monopoly on the use of force as with 
the US and UK, but instead developing states are attempting to assert their monopoly through 
a strong military and then failing to control that force. Although the routes vary and the 
reasons differ, the net result is that the public private divide becomes blurred in both Western 
and developing countries.    
 
The international rules on state responsibility are used in part to determine whether conduct is 
a ‘public’ act of state for which the state is legally responsible, or a ‘private’ act for which the 
state does not bear direct responsibility. These rules are not well-suited to the turn of the 
century phenomenon of Western governments contracting out security functions to private 
actors, or governments of developing states being unwilling or unable to prevent state actors 
from undertaking essentially private acts.  
 
 
4. Blurring the Distinction in Indonesia: The Issue of ‘State Capture’ 
 
Turning to examine the public-private distinction in an important developing state, Indonesia, 
the norm is not for private security to be operating under a government contract. The situation 
is that state agents (military and police) provide security services often for commercial gain 
to a business, or based on a business contract with a militia or private security firm.34  
 
This mixture of state and commercial interests not only blurs the public/private distinction, 
but is also evidence of an intertwining of military and business arrangements. The Indonesian 
situation is symptomatic of what is known as ‘state capture’, where powerful individuals or 
                                                          
33 Ibid., p. 6. 
34 Crouch (2007), chapter 11. See footnote 3 for payments made by MNCs to the TNI. 
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interest groups, such as the military seek to influence the ‘rules of the game’, i.e. the 
formation and enforcement of laws and regulation, to protect and promote their own 
interests.35 In the case of Indonesia, it is a long-established practice that the military self-
finances part of its activities. Since independence successive governments have variously 
endorsed, or chosen to ignore, the military’s economic activities, which include inter alia 
raising funds from military-owned enterprises and informal alliances, with associated 
payments from private allies.36 
 
Applying the rules of state responsibility on attribution to Indonesian military and security 
forces, it is clear that they are agents of the state and, if they are violating human rights in the 
course of their operations, their violations should be considered as acts of state for which 
Indonesia is responsible.37 Under the law of state responsibility if such forces are operating in 
the private sphere, but continue to use their status as state actors to do so then arguably their 
conduct remains an act of state.38 It may be that Indonesia’s security services are not 
exceeding their authority or contravening instructions when acting for commercial gain, 
given that the state security forces have been enmeshed in private activities virtually since 
independence,39 but that would make their actions wholly acts of state. Furthermore, even 
criminal activities engaged in by state security forces, including export smuggling, timber 
smuggling, illegal logging, illegal mining, extortion, racketeering in drugs, gambling and 
prostitution,40 would be deemed acts of state if they are carried out by state agents purporting 
to act in that capacity. The fact that the Indonesian Government has at various points, albeit 
with little enthusiasm, tried to prohibit, or limit, state security forces for private commercial 
activities,41 does not prevent such actions continuing to be classified as acts of state. 
 
It is undoubtedly the case that the rules on state responsibility were drafted by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) on the basis that ultra vires activities by state agents are 
the exception and that normally state security actors operate under constitutional chains of 
command and control, but practice in Indonesia clearly shows a pattern of behaviour by state 
                                                          
35 Kingsbury (2003). 
36 Human Rights Watch (2006). 
37 Article 4, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001. 
38 Ibid., Article 7. 
39 Crouch (2007), p. 274; Robinson (1986), pp. 250-270. For a discussion of the activities of various militias and 
revolutionary forces from which the Indonesian army emerged during the revolution see: Cribb (1991).  
40 Human Rights Watch (2006), pp. 2, 10-12, 56-59, 63-79. 
41 For example, in 1974 by regulation No. 6/1974; TNI Law No. 34/2004; Presidential Decree No.43/2009; 
Human Rights Watch (2010), pp. 1-8. 
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security actors at the margins of the public/private distinction. The current complex 
arrangement of private security providers in Indonesia, include organized militia under state 
control, militia groups established by companies, independent militia groups employed by 
companies, local private security companies (often established by retired security personnel), 
PMSCs, the TNI (Indonesian military) and Polri (state police), especially Brimob (the 
paramilitary special operations force).42  
 
It could be argued that the jurisprudence invoked by the ILC as justification for the rule, that 
ultra vires actions of state actors when acting in that capacity continue to be acts of state, is 
Western-biased as the rules were formulated by claims commissions set up in the early 
twentieth century to remediate Western individuals and businesses for violations of a claimed 
international minimum standard while operating in dangerous or violent parts of the globe.43  
So although the rules may look clearer, in term of imputing conduct to Indonesia, they lack 
traction with developing states as they are rules derived from a Western-dominated and 
largely colonial era.    
 
Other soft law instruments recognize a more complex security picture. The Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) of 2000 acknowledged that in ‘many 
countries, security for … large extractive industry projects is provided, at least in part, by 
state security forces, be they police or military forces’.44 It goes further to state that ‘in some 
instances, violence and even abuses in and around extractive industry projects have been 
perpetrated by state security forces’. ‘By their nature, state security forces are accountable to 
the sovereign government, and not to the companies’.45 Although this statement is a more 
accurate reflection of reality, it still fails to capture the extent and depth of penetration of 
state security into the commercial sector found in countries like Indonesia. 
 
                                                          
42 In relation to state organised militia, company militia and independent militia see Human Rights Watch 
(2003), pp. 6-8, 30, 50-53. On local private security companies see Sciascia (2013), p. 178.  
43 Crawford (2002), pp. 107-8, citing Caire Claim (1929) 5 RIAA p. 531. For a similar statement in the human 
rights context see the Velasquez Rodriguez case, before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (1989) 95 
ILR p. 296. 
44 The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) is a multi-stakeholder initiative consisting 
of governments, companies and NGOs, which was established in 2000 (and subsequently amended through 
2017). It counts just three developing countries – Argentina, Colombia and Ghana – among its 10 government 
participants (the others are Australia, Canada, The Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, UK and US); there are 31 
MNCs from the extractive industries and 13 NGOs (as of January 2018). 
45 Statement by Voluntary Principles Participants on Memoranda of Understanding Between Companies and 
State Security Forces (2014) available at http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/VPs_-_Statement_on_MOUs.pdf Accessed 5 July 2018. 
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In any case the VPSHR has limited relevance in Indonesia for two reasons. One is that, aside 
from the fact that Indonesia is not a participating state, the non-binding character of the 
VPSHR renders this instrument somewhat ineffective. The other reason is that company 
participation is currently focused on extractive industry MNCs, which in the case of 
Indonesia holds good for company participants like ExxonMobil, Freeport-McMoRan and 
Rio Tinto, but does not extend to MNCs in the natural resources sector, particularly those 
engaged with timber and/or agricultural commodities. 
 
Indonesia was an original ‘target country’ for the VPSHR due to the problems associated 
with corporate security practices and corruption in such a militarised state.46 Over the years, 
participants in the VPSHR have made efforts to engage with the Indonesian government and 
extractive industries and companies.47 Members of the government pillar have sought to 
discuss the voluntary principles in meetings with Indonesian government representatives, and 
members of the corporate pillar have reported on their efforts to disseminate information, 
engage with local communities and provide training to security providers, including the 
police.  
 
Since the turn of the century there have been numerous reports of human rights violations 
against MNCs, like ExxonMobil, Freeport McMoRan and Rio Tinto and their security 
providers, supporting the contention that incorporating the VPSHR into company policies and 
management systems is one thing while improving security practices on the ground is 
another. Getting the government on board and improving communication with local 
communities might help. For example, BP included the VPSHR in its agreement with the 
Indonesian government in relation to the Tangguh natural gas project in West Papua, which 
included ‘an integrated community based security plan’,48 although there are continuing 
concerns in relation to BP’s fulfilment of its human rights commitments.49 The VPSHR could 
potentially have a meaningful role to play in Indonesia if the its scope were extended to the 
MNCs and their subsidiaries in the natural resources sector, especially the palm oil and 
timber sectors. 
 
                                                          
46 EarthRights International and The Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (2013), p. 9; 
Hendry and Klein (2010), p. 7.  
47 Voluntary Principles Initiative (2015), pp. 18-19.  
48 EarthRights International and The Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (2013), p. 20.  




5. Public Liability for Private Security 
 
In the case of purely private military and security companies (PMSCs), which are not hiding 
behind state authority or exercising governmental functions, it is unlikely that such operators 
will be acting on the instructions of the Indonesian government, or under its direction and 
control. Thus there will be no direct engagement of Indonesian responsibility, except in cases 
where the security forces have hired groups of thugs to perpetrate violence or intimidation.50 
In the absence of direct state responsibility for the wrongful acts or omissions of contractors, 
and mindful of the limits of the second pillar on corporate responsibility of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights,51 there remains the possibility of identifying due 
diligence obligations on states, although it is an underdeveloped area. Such obligations could, 
for example, be extended to regulatory authorities responsible for plantation licences and 
oversight. The idea is that contracting states (along with host states and, arguably, home 
states of PMSCs) should fulfil positive obligations (by licensing, monitoring and, where 
necessary, meting out punishment) to reduce the number of human rights or humanitarian law 
violations by PMSCs they contract with; or who are based, or operate, within their 
jurisdictions.52 
 
Corporate and individual responsibility for PMSCs is to a large degree dependent on states 
taking their responsibilities seriously and controlling PMSCs in ways they failed to do for 
their predecessors (e.g. the trading companies in the 17th and 18th centuries). The Montreux 
Document of 2008, a non-binding document, is directed at states who engage with PMSCs. It 
was sponsored by the Swiss government and the ICRC and supported by the major home 
states of PMSCs as well as a number of host states.53 It takes the form of a non-binding 
instrument (enabling its rapid adoption), which was originally subscribed to by 17 states. By 
August 2017 the number of participating states had increased to 54, as well as three 
international organizations (EU, NATO and the OSCE). Indonesia is not a participating state.  
 
                                                          
50 Human Rights Watch (2006), p. 13; Human Rights Watch (2003), p. 46.  
51 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises (2011). 
52 White (2012). 
53 Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to 
Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict 2008. 
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The Montreux Document itself points to principles of international law (mainly international 
humanitarian law) applicable to home, host and contracting states of PMSCs. It does little to 
deal with the problem of imputability to states of wrongful PMSC conduct as it adopts the 
narrow orthodox view of state responsibility identified above and makes it clear that 
contracting with PMSCs does not mean the state is responsible for their actions.54 However, 
the good practices identified in the second part of the Document (including supporting the 
idea of national licensing schemes for PMSCs) could be seen through a due diligence lens, 
although they are not currently crafted as obligations upon states. In addition, to its narrow 
focus on armed conflict, and its non-binding nature, the Montreux Document contains no 
mechanisms for supervision or enforcement, thereby further detracting from its overall 
effectivenesss. 
 
Although Indonesia has not signed up to the Montreux Document, it is under positive 
obligations derived from the human rights treaties to which it is a party. In its General 
Comment No. 31 of 2004, the Human Rights Committee observed that obligations under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) ‘do not, as such, have direct 
horizontal effect’ between private individuals, but ‘the positive obligations on State Parties to 
ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, 
not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by 
private persons or entities’. It follows that there will be ‘circumstances in which a failure to 
ensure Covenant rights … would give rise to violations by States Parties of those rights, as a 
result of States Parties’ failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to 
prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or 
entities’.55  
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has taken a similar approach to 
rights guaranteed under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),56 when it issued its long-awaited General Comment No. 24 of 2017 on economic, 
social and cultural rights in the context of business activities.57 It deals inter alia with the 
duties of states to prevent effectively infringements of economic, social and cultural rights in 
                                                          
54 Ibid., part 1, para. 7. 
55 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, ‘The Nature of the General Legal Obligation’, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (29 March 2004), para. 8. 
56 Marks and Azizi (2010), p. 731.  
57 UN Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24 (2017) ‘State obligations in 
the context of business activities’ UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 (10 August 2017).  
18 
 
the context of business activities both within their national territories and extraterritorially in 
situations over which states parties may exercise control.58 
 
In this light it is possible to examine the laws and acts of the Indonesian government with 
regard to private security actors to see if there are any indications that it is taking positive 
measures to regulate private security providers. National regulations were introduced in 2006 
in an effort to regulate private security in response to the increased number of private security 
providers following rising instability in the country.59 Thus, the Regulation of the Chief of 
National Police No. 17/2006 concerning guidance on the creation of PMSCs sought to control 
the formation of private security companies and established a licensing system for private 
security services.60 The Regulation of the Chief of National Police No. 18/2006 on Training 
and the Curriculum of Private Security Guards sought to improve guidelines for the training 
of guards.61 The Regulation of the Chief of National Police No. 24/2007 addressed the 
management of security systems of organizations, companies and government offices.62 
While these regulations represent the first steps to regulate and prevent harm by the private 
security sector, the police are responsible for administrating the system which, when  
combined with a lack of resources to support a robust licensing and oversight regime, as well 




6. Business and Security in Indonesia 
 
The human rights jurisprudence discussed at the outset of this article provides very little 
mention of the problem of private security (either by state actors acting in a private capacity, 
or by private security companies acting agents for the state), which is surprising given the 
evidence of such in Indonesia, especially a long history of state security forces effectively 
hiring themselves out to companies.64 Exxon Mobil and Freeport McMoRan are two high 
                                                          
58 Ibid., para. 10. 
59 Liss (2014).  
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid.   
63 Ibid.   
64 Human Rights Watch (2006), pp. 45-56, 133; Down to Earth (2001); Global Witness (2005); Yunanto (2006), 
pp. 50-51; Clarke (2008), p. 9. 
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profile MNCs that have caused controversy by making significant payments to the military 
and police.65 Evidence suggests that the payments have been made to both individuals and the 
institutions; however, this ‘commercialization’ of the state security sector confuses the 
institutional role of the military and police with a private security function. It also evidences 
the extent of state capture, referred to above, in which state (predominantly the military) and 
corporate interests are entangled.66 In this context, it should be noted that while Presidential 
Decree 63/2004 gives the military and police a mandate for protecting national vital objects,67 
there is no official policy on MNC payments to state security institutions.  
 
Similarly, no attention has been given to the emergence of local private security companies 
owned by ex-military officials (such as PT Garuda Prima) and the presence of international 
private security companies in Indonesia (such as G4S),68 as the demand for private security 
increased following the fall of Suharto and with rising instability in the region. There is 
mention of the problem of violations of rights, including women’s and children’s rights on the 
larger scale plantations, but again this is not linked to private security.69 CSO and media 
reports implicate private security forces, along with state security forces, in these types of 
human rights violations although the distinction between the two actors is not always clear. 
 
Significantly, the separation of the military and police in 2000 removed the police from 
military control following the implementation of Decree TAP MPR No. VI and VII/1999, 
whereby the function of internal security was reserved to the police, and the military was 
made responsible for national defence.70 State Defence Act No. 2/2002 and the National 
Police Act No. 2/2002 further defined the respective roles of the military and police and 
introduced other institutional reforms to increase civilian control over the military.71  
 
However, the separation was not complete – Article 41(2) of the National Police Act left 
room for the military to assist the police and Article 7.2 (b) of TNI Law No. 34/2004 
subsequently retained a role for the military to deal with a wide range of external and internal 
                                                          
65 Ibid.  
66 Yunanto (2006), p. 50. 
67 Decision on Security of National Vital Object, issued by the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and 
Security Affairs (27 January 2006).   
68 For discussion of private security companies in Indonesia see Liss (2014); Sciascia (2013), p. 178; Robinson, 
Wilson and Meliala (2008).  
69 See for example, Amnesty International (2016), p. 148.  
70 Sukma and Prasetyono (2003), p. 17. 
71 Ibid., pp. 17-24.   
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threats, including separatist movements, armed insurgencies, terrorist threats, security threats 
to the nation and its vital resources, natural disasters and acts of piracy, all of  which reflect 
ongoing concerns over the need to protect national unity and a continued military influence in 
politics.72 The military was unwilling to relinquish the primary role it assumed throughout the 
Suharto administration with regards to internal security, while the police asserted its 
increased law enforcement powers and interfered with the military’s criminal and business 
activities. Separating the two security institutions thus increased tensions between them and 
contributed to rising instability in the country. Whereas the state had restricted private 
security companies under Suharto, ex-military officials took the opportunity in the reformasi 
era to establish local private security companies to meet increased demand for private 
security.73  
 
Besides, the involvement of the military in private security is only really hinted at in the 
reports of the UN and treaty-based human rights bodies discussed at the outset of this article 
so the line between public and private security, and the human rights implications thereof, are 
not explored at all. This contrasts with the evidence that it is not just the Indonesian state that 
is slowly being demilitarized (a process started in the reform period), but also the commercial 
sector (especially after 2004 and the attempts to restrict military business ownership by virtue 
of TNI Law No. 34/2004 at least to the extent of establishing some oversight of military 
businesses).74 However, this seems to have just created a space for former military, militias, 
criminals, businesses and private security actors to exploit.75   
As has been seen soft law international standards on security and human rights have not had 
any traction in Indonesia. Similar observations can be made in relation to soft law standards 
on business and human rights. In an interview with the Business and Human Rights Resource 
Centre, the Human Rights Commission drew attention to a number of factors impeding the 
government’s ability to promote business and human rights, including: the lack of resources 
for enforcement, monitoring and prosecution; opposition by economic interest groups, 
business associations and influential people outside government; opposition and lack of 
consensus and awareness in government; political limitations imposed by foreign 
governments or multilateral institutions; concern about deterring foreign investment; and 
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other challenges in coordinating government and lack of capacity.76 A number of reasons, 
representing the different priorities and competing interests within Indonesia’s post-Suharto 
democracy thus help to explain the slow progress being made in the development of human 
rights policy for the country’s corporate sector.  
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), another non-binding 
international instrument,  were developed by John Ruggie as a global standard for preventing 
and addressing the risk of adverse impacts of business activities on human rights based on the 
‘protect, respect, and remedy’ framework.77 The UNGPs are formulated in three mutually 
enforcing pillars. Pillar I outlines the duty of states to establish binding rules to promote 
respect for human rights by non-state actors, including businesses, and identifies ways for 
states to discharge their duty more effectively.78 Of particular note is that under Pillar I, the 
UNGPs address the state-business nexus, by requiring in Guiding Principle 4 that ‘States 
should take additional steps to protect against human rights abuses by business enterprises 
that are owned or controlled by the State […] including, where appropriate, by requiring 
human rights due diligence’.79 Guiding Principle 4 could apply to the Indonesian extractives 
and natural resources sector where the government or a state entity (possibly including the 
military) has a share, or is a partner, in the business enterprise.  
 
Moreover, Guiding Principle 5 requires that ‘States should exercise adequate oversight in 
order to meet their international human rights obligations when they contract with, or 
legislate for, business enterprises to provide services that may impact upon the enjoyment of 
human rights’.80 Here again, where the Government of Indonesia has entered directly into an 
concession contract or licence with an MNC in the extractive or natural resources sector, it 
remains under a continuing obligation with respect to the protection of international human 
rights in its territory. 
 
                                                          
76 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (2018). 
77 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
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Pillar II spells out the implications of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. 
Guiding Principle 11 requires business entities to avoid infringing on the human rights of 
others and to address any adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.81 This 
means not only those adverse human rights impacts that may occur through a company’s own 
business activities or entities within a business enterprise, such as subsidiaries, but also any 
adverse impacts that may be linked to a company’s broader business relationships.82 Of 
significance is the introduction of this requirement for all business enterprises, irrespective of 
their size, the nature and context of its operations.83 Thus, logging and palm oil plantation 
businesses in Indonesia, which are either owned or controlled directly by MNCs, or through 
local subsidiaries, are covered equally.  
 
Similarly, such companies and/or their subsidiaries need to have in place a human rights due 
diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their 
impacts on human rights, as set out in Guiding Principle 17. This requirement even extends to 
third-party suppliers in their supply chains.84 Again, human rights due diligence will be 
significant in the upstream supply chain, i.e. from the plantation to the mill and the port, in 
Indonesian oil palm plantations or logging operations. 
 
Pillar III affirms that states must ensure access to effective judicial remedy for human rights 
abuses and that business enterprises should establish or participate in effective grievance 
mechanisms for individuals and communities that may be adversely impacted.85 In this 
context, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, at the 
request of the Human Rights Council, has produced a report on improving accountability and 
access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuses.86 
 
In order to disseminate and promote the implementation of the UNGPs, the Human Rights 
Council established the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises in June 2011.87 The Working Group called on 
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82 Ibid., Guiding Principle 13(a) and 13(b). 
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states to develop National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights (NAPs) to 
demonstrate their implementation of the UNGPs,88 and provided guidance in December 2014 
(updated in November 2016).89  
 
Encouragingly, Indonesia became the fifteenth state and the first Asian country to launch its 
NAP on 16 June 2017.90 The Indonesian National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas 
HAM) began developing the NAP in September 2014 in response to the lack of focus on 
corporations in the National Plan of Action for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and increasing land conflicts and human rights abuses involving corporations.91 It was 
completed following a multistakeholder effort between Komnas HAM, relevant government 
ministries (e.g. the Ministry for Industry), institutions (e.g. the Institute for Policy Research 
and Advocacy (ELSAM)), business groups and civil society (e.g. the Foundation for 
International Human Rights Reporting Standards (FIHRRST)).92  
 
Various actors believe that the government should develop coherent legislation to ensure that 
both the government and companies fulfil their responsibilities under the UNGPs. They hope 
that the NAP will provide the necessary impetus for further legislation at the presidential 
level to protect human rights from the negative impacts of business operations.93 Rather than 
leaving responsibility for human rights with companies, and given the lack of operational 
impact of corporate efforts thus far, it is felt that the role of the state should be enhanced to 
support the implementation of the UNGPs and regulate corporate behaviour.94 However, any 
readjustment of the relationship between the state, corporate actors and individual must 
address the role of the security sector if meaningful progress is to be made towards reducing 
human rights violations in the natural resources industry, including the agricultural 
commodities sector.  
 
As recognized by the embassy representative for the Netherlands, successful implementation 
of the UNGPs not only depends on the necessary government legislation but a change in 
corporate culture so that companies recognize the guiding principles as a moral concern 
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rather than legal issue.95 Inevitably, however, market forces will help to motivate companies 
to take their human rights responsibilities more seriously.96 Timber certification has improved 
the competitiveness of Indonesian wood.97 There are increasing concerns for the palm oil 
market following European palm oil initiatives, including the non-binding European 
Parliament Resolution on Palm Oil and Deforestation of Rainforest adopted of 4 April 
2017.98   
 
In contrast to the UNGPs, there is no evidence that private security companies operating in 
Indonesia have engaged with the relevant international standards contained in the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC) of 2010. Although it is 
not binding on PMSCs, the Code does detail the human rights that PMSCs are expected to 
respect (including restrictions on the use of force and torture). Further, it requires PMSCs to 
exercise due diligence in vetting and training of employees as well as having grievance 
procedures and effective remedies to victims of abuse.  
 
In September 2013, a governance and oversight mechanism was established as an 
Association under Swiss law: the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA) based 
in Geneva. The ICoCA Board of Directors, made up of representatives of states (US, UK 
Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland), industry and civil society organizations, is 
responsible for developing procedures for certification, monitoring, reporting, assessing 
performance and addressing complaints. The Association is empowered to request a member 
company to take corrective action to remedy non-compliance with the Code within a 
specified time period. A non-compliant company may suffer suspension or termination of 
membership.99 Of the 600 or so companies that signed up to the ICoC only 95 have joined the 
ICoCA, with none from Indonesia.100 Only by being a member of the ICoCA will a PMSC be 
required to meet agreed international standards. At the Board meeting in March 2016 ‘the 
Certification Committee continued discussions regarding challenges faced by Members 
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wishing to become certified to currently-recognized standards’. Challenges ‘included access 
to standards (particularly for PSCs operating in the “Global south” and non-English speaking 
regions) as well as the cost of certification’.101 Despite these difficulties the Certification 
Process opened on 1 November 2016, recognising PMSCs with independent accredited 
certification to US standards (PSC 1) as well as international ones (ISO 28007, ISO 
18788).102 There are procedures for reporting, monitoring and assessing accredited PMSC 
performance, including provision for field based reviews.103  
 
The specific issue of business and security has been more squarely put before the UN’s 
Human Rights Council by a written statement submitted in 2016 by the Asian Legal Resource 
Centre (ARLC), an NGO with consultative status before ECOSOC, entitled ‘Indonesia: Lack 
of human rights policy in business sectors’.104 The ARLC pointed to instances of ‘chaos and 
conflict between security forces and the local community … as the community strives to 
reclaim the land being used by these companies and struggles for the right to a healthy 
environment’. It also emphasised that ‘the increasing number of agrarian conflicts in the 
plantation area is evidence of the expansion of large-scale plantations in Indonesia. It also 
noted that one of the biggest commodities in plantation areas is palm oil’; and that ‘the 
majority of human rights violations in the agrarian sector and natural resources were 
committed by the Police and Military. The pattern of violations is fabrication of charges, land 
confiscations, violence and torture, and shooting to death’.105 
 
Although this statement places the role of business at the heart of Indonesia’s human rights 
problems, and it recognizes the role of the state security apparatus in the expansion of the 
natural resources and mining sectors at the expense of the local populations, it does not 
identify the blurring of the line between the state and private security as being an issue. To be 
able to exert control over human rights abuses, it is important to identify the functions of the 
state and those of the private sector; to determine when the acts of private actors are 
attributable to the state; but also to recognize that the government still has positive 
obligations to regulate the private sector in order to prevent human rights abuses. 
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7. Human Rights Violations by Security Actors 
 
Numerous violations of human rights obligations by state security actors working for MNCs 
in the natural resources sector, including agricultural commodities, have been reported. They 
include arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of life, torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrest and detention, restrictions on 
peaceful assembly and association, forced evictions, denial of customary land rights, 
destruction of livelihoods, and environmental pollution. Some specific examples drawn from 
publicly available information are given here to highlight the nature and extent of the 
problem:  
 
 During the 1980s and 1990s, land was unlawfully seized from the indigenous Malay 
and Sakai communities in Riau province of Sumatra for the PT Arara Abadi 
plantation. The military and police used intimidation and violence to forcibly evict 
local people from community lands.106 
 In 1995, the Australian Council on Overseas Aid, an Australian non-governmental 
organization, reported that military and mine security personnel were involved in the 
deaths and disappearances of indigenous people within Freeport’s mining 
concession.107  
 In 2001, a man was shot and killed, and in 2002 another was seriously injured, by 
Brimob forces working at PT Indo Muro Kencana owned by Australia’s Aurora 
Gold.108 The mine has a long history of land conflicts with indigenous Dayak people, 
who were forcibly removed from the land and their housing and equipment 
destroyed.109  
 In 2004, during protests against forcible evictions at Newcrest’s Halmahera mine, 
Brimob forces killed one person, shot another and assaulted a number of others.110 
 On 11-12 July 2009, three people were killed near Freeport’s Grasberg mine. 
Indonesian authorities attributed responsibility to the Free Papua Movement but 
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doubts were cast on those claims when police recovered military and police grade 
bullet casings from the scene.111 
 In October 2011, in further clashes at Freeport’s Grasberg mine, police and security 
forces shot at protesters, who were striking against the minimum wage and blocking 
access for replacement workers, killing one person and wounding others.112 
 In 2012, Brimob officers working for the palm oil company, PT Agro Bukit, shot and 
killed a person when he was fleeing with other villagers who had gone to the 
plantation to enquire about the arrest of local farmers.113 
 In 2012, state security forces working for Kaltim Prima Coal mine in 2012 assaulted 
workers who were protesting against the company’s failure to implement a human 
rights agreement at the mining concession.114  
 Throughout 2016-2017, several allegations have been made against Brimob forces 
concerning the use force and intimidation while evicting local people from 
community lands.115 For instance, in July 2016, Brimob forces assisted PT Musi 
Hutan Persada in the forcible evictions of the Cawand Gumilir villagers in Musi 
Rawas, South Sumatra during the hostile takeover of productive land.116  
 In November 2017, Indonesian NGOs issued a press release claiming that RSPO 
member ANJ used Brimob personnel on several occasions to violently repress 
protests by indigenous Iwaro people demonstrating against the takeover of their land 
without consent for palm oil cultivation by ANJ subsidiary PT Permata Putera 
Mandiri.117  
 
Fieldwork undertaken by several of the authors, employed by the Indonesian NGO 
(Inkrispena), and supported by the Dutch NGO (SOMO, or the Centre for Research on 
Multinational Corporations) explored the relationship between security providers and two 
MNCs involved in the exploitation of natural resources in the agricultural commodities sector 
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and embroiled in numerous instances of human rights violations.118 The full report includes 
the results of the two case studies: one involving palm oil company Asiatic Persada (AP), 
owned by the Ganda Group, and one involving logging company Wirakarya Sakti (WKS), 
owned by the Sinar Mas Group, both Indonesian subsidiaries of larger MNCs. These two case 
studies, which involved fieldwork in Sumatra in July and August 2016 supplementing 
publicly available information, reveal a pernicious and deliberate erosion and violation of the 
rights of local inhabitants across the spectrum of security actors, showing that public security 
actors are protecting corporate interests rather than performing public functions.119  
 
 
8. Case Study on Palm Oil and Security 
 
The first case study revealed a conflict between PT Asiatic Persada (AP), a palm oil company 
owned by the Indonesian conglomerate Ganda Group, and the indigenous Suka Anak Dalam 
(SAD) people and former migrant populations involving 3,550 ha. of AP’s 20,000 ha palm 
oil concession in Jambi province Sumatra, with a focal point being the village of Bungku.120 
Throughout the social and land conflict involving the SAD communities that live in the AP 
plantation, these communities have experienced violent action against them from both private 
and public security actors. These incidents have involved AP staff, its security personnel, and 
Indonesian security forces in the form of police, the mobile police brigade (Brimob), and the 
Indonesian military (TNI). The research work produced a detailed, but non-exhaustive 
overview, of the harassment and intimidation that has taken place in the area in the past 
years.121 Reportedly, the conflict between AP and the SAD population living on or near their 
concession has been smouldering since 2000, with the company and the communities 
claiming ownership of the same area.122   
 
AP employs its own security personnel, in varying capacities. In July 2011, AP hired the 
mobile police brigade (Brimob) to increase the security of their plantation.123 A month later 
on 8 August, a violent confrontation took place over allegations of a local resident stealing  
the company’s palm fruit. This resulted in an escalation of confrontation between Brimob and 
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a number of villagers resulting in the firing of weapons, injuries, the setting alight of the 
accused’s house and the eviction, looting and bulldozing of over eighty residences by AP 
personnel. 124  
 
More than one hundred people that fled the scene took up shelter in the neighbouring forest 
and nearby villages, with food aid and plastic shelters being provided by the Indonesian 
Department of Social Affairs, but only after 20 days.125  
 
Beyond the violence inflicted upon Bungku’s inhabitants, the presence of AP’s private 
security personnel in the area, backed up by state security, constantly reminds the villagers of 
the company’s presence and power, causing them to further fear for their safety. For example, 
in 2011, following the confrontation, Brimob personnel undertook frequent patrols of the 
communities in the area, with one of Bungku’s hamlets visited twice daily by 6-10 armed 
policemen. They reportedly approached homes, verbally abusing and threatening to shoot the 
inhabitants while firing their weapons into the air. It was said that interviewees from Bungku 
felt terrorised by the actions of the police.126 
 
Bungku is beset on all sides by the concessions of four companies, all with their own private 
security personnel. The different security forces are not easily identifiable, as most do not 
wear insignia indicating which company they work for. Meanwhile, security personnel guard 
roads leading to and on the plantation. AP’s security guards are known to drive through 
Bungku in their 4x4 trucks at high speed, causing dust in the road to come up which in turn 
causes breathing and visibility issues, as well as soiling villagers’ clean clothes hung out to 
dry.127 
 
In December 2013, eight months after AP was sold by Wilmar to the Ganda Group, 1,500 
state security personnel, a mix of Brimob and TNI members, reportedly drove 500 SAD 
families from their land,128 and looted and destroyed at least 295 houses.129 Allegations were 
made that this had been done under orders of AP, and that the company had paid soldiers and 
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police to clear the land.130 SAD villagers stated that during the eviction their savings and 
other belongings had been looted, and their livestock killed.131 Between December 2013 and 
March 2014, 700 huts and houses of communities in conflict with AP were reportedly 
destroyed by the police and military. 
 
In February 2014, when thousands of evicted community members attempted to return to 
what they perceive as their indigenous land, they were blocked by the police and the TNI or 
Indonesian military. According to subsequent reports, the land has remained inaccessible to 
the former inhabitants, with AP’s security staff guarding it.132 The most recent widely 
reported violent incident between the SAD and AP took place on 6 March 2014 when a 
Bungku inhabitant was abducted from his home by six personnel from the TNI. He was taken 
to one of AP’s security posts where he was stripped and beaten, and made to lick his own 
blood off the floor.133 This was because he had witnessed the military removing signposts 
which demarcated contested land in the area, by identifying that land as claimed both by local 
communities and by two subsidiaries of AP. During the beating, local police officials present 
at the security post watched the physical abuse without intervening.134 According to 
Indonesian NGOs, Walhi and Kontras, the targeted individual had long been involved in the 
confrontation between AP and the SAD, and was abducted for opposing AP. According to his 
lawyers, the military personnel beat and tortured him both on route to and at AP’s 
facilities.135 Villagers demanding his release were beaten, kicked and stun guns were used 
against them by AP’s security staff and TNI personnel.136 One of those villagers was taken by 
the military and company security, who bound his hands before beating him to death.137 
Other villagers protesting about the abduction were chased off by the military, who 
threatened to shoot them.138 
 
The Palembang Military Court sentenced each of the six soldiers involved in the killing to 
three months in prison. The Palembang Military Court’s judgment stated that the soldiers’ 
mandate in Jambi province had been to prevent conflict between the SAD and AP in Bungku 
                                                          
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Rainforest Rescue (2014); Global Forest Coalition (2013). 
133 Amnesty International (2015). 
134 Somo and Inkrispena (2017), Interview with female interviewee, location and date withheld for safety. 
135 Ibid., interview with National Peasant Union, location and date withheld for safety. 
136 Ibid., interview with female interviewee, location and date withheld for safety. 
137 Amnesty International (2015). 
138 SOMO and Inkrispena (2017), interview with female interviewee, location and date withheld for safety. 
31 
 
village.139 The trial by Military Court has been heavily condemned by Indonesian NGO 
KONTRAS, who stated that it was not conducted according to law, and that the sentences 
imposed on the military personnel were unfairly lenient. Five of AP’s private security 
personnel were arrested by Jambi’s regional police and charged with violence resulting in the 
individual’s death.140 
 
The above mentioned security incidents are directly related to the vulnerable position of local 
communities. In a paper analysing the complaints pertaining to Wilmar’s palm oil 
plantations, including the AP case, it was concluded that the deeper-seated problems facing 
people affected by the palm oil sector can be exacerbated by patterns of violence and 
intimidation by state and non-state actors, who can be deployed to ‘protect’ palm oil 
plantations from people who ‘occupy’ them, or to harvest fruit that is legally considered the 
property of the company.141 More specifically, the arrests (for theft of oil palm in Jambi) 
involve company security guards working together with local police, reinforcing a widely 
held perception that the police effectively act as an extension of the company.142 
 
 
9. Case Study on Logging and Security 
 
The second case study found a social and land conflict existed between PT Wirakarya Sakti 
(WKS), a logging company owned by the Indonesian Sinar Mas Group, and communities 
living close to its concessions in four separate villages, in three of Jambi’s regencies. 
Community members who were interviewed expressed animosity towards WKS, stating the 
company had caused them to lose land and livelihood, as well as the loss of their way of life, 
and pointed to the death and criminalization of their fellow community members by company 
security, Brimob and the TNI.143 The focus here is on one of the villages that was the subject 
of particular investigation during the fieldwork. 
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Lubuk Mandarsah is a village consisting of 10 separate hamlets, some of which reportedly 
overlap with WKS’ concession in the area. WKS’ presence in the area was first noticed in 
2006, when the company announced that it would be constructing roads through the area. 
After the roads were finished that same year, WKS personnel reportedly returned to Lubuk 
Mandarsah and, accompanied by the TNI, evicted several villagers and cleared their 
cultivated land, thereby destroying their livelihoods.144 In the following two years, the 
remaining villagers were often visited by military personnel, who verbally intimidated them 
and fired their weapons into the air in an effort to scare them from the area.145  
 
In 2008, the conflict intensified as Lubuk Mandarsah’s inhabitants repossessed part of the 
land WKS had claimed as their concession, and in 2009 when they burned some of WKS’ 
heavy equipment as well as a fuel truck. Following the burning, several Brimob trucks came 
to the village with arrest warrants for 11 villagers, but left without detaining anyone. 146 In 
2013, Lubuk Mandarsah’s villagers reclaimed another portion of land previously taken by 
WKS. Interviewees stated that in response to this, WKS deployed the so-called Rapid 
Response Force (URC) of WKS’s security company PT. Mangala Cipta Persada (MCP) to 
this part of the concession, after which villagers were often visited at home by URC 
personnel and otherwise intimidated into leaving the area.147 The tensions between Lubuk 
Mandarsah’s community and WKS’ security came to a head when, in February of 2015, 
several URC personnel beat a local union organizer to death. The organizer’s body, hands 
tied together behind his back, was found the next day in a nearby swamp. He had been beaten 
and then had a rope tied around his neck, which led to his suffocation and death.148 
 
As a result of the court case covering the incident, five URC personnel were sentenced to 
prison for periods varying from eight to 15 years. It was noted by the Indonesian NGO Walhi 
that during the court proceedings no attention was paid to the question of whether the URC 
personnel had been acting under instructions to use force if necessary. Reportedly, the judges 
assumed that URC personnel had acted violently at their own volition. Furthermore, no 
representatives of WKS or MCP attended the proceedings.149  
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Following the murder, WKS’ sole customer Asia Pulp and Paper (APP) stated that they ‘gave 
instructions’ to WKS’ management to suspend all security personnel implicated in the 
incident, as well as the head of security at MCP.150 In APP’s Sustainability Report 2015, the 
company’s managing director stated that he was ‘deeply saddened by the death of a 
community member in Jambi, following an altercation with a third-party security contractor 
working for one of APP’s pulpwood suppliers, Wira Karya Sakti (WKS)’. APP’s managing 
director also stated that ‘WKS ceased its contract with the security contractor and responded 
to the recommendations made by … KOMNAS HAM. Following independent advice from 
NGOs and third-party security experts we have also developed and implemented 
improvements to our security arrangements across the organization’.151  
 
Towards the end of 2015, WKS hired another company for their private security, known as 
Bima. Several months later, Bima was replaced by international security company G4S, 
which is now responsible for security at WKS’ concession.152 However, MCP is still 
employed by other Sinar Mas subsidiaries in the area and several former MCP employees are 
now employed by G4S. Reportedly, G4S has provided more information and training to its 
employees on Indonesian legislation and the company’s code of conduct to which they must 
adhere.153 
 
Considering both cases studies together, it can be concluded that the rule of law is not 
functioning in the areas of operation of both AP and WKS. The Indonesian security forces, as 
well as private security companies, do not protect local people’s rights but, instead, seem 
focused on protecting corporate interests. This has allowed company security personnel to 
operate with near impunity, while public security officials add to the violence. In the case of 
WKS, it is unclear if the situation on the ground has improved after G4S was hired in 2015 to 
take over the security management of the WKS concession. 
 
 
10. Accountability and Access to Justice 
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The problems in applying the rules of state responsibility to Indonesia, where the 
public/private distinction is blurred, have already been alluded to. There is also limited 
evidence of the other two forms of applicable legal responsibility - corporate responsibility 
and individual responsibility – being implemented in Indonesia. The case studies show that 
the perpetrators of violence often go unpunished but, even where subject to criminal charge, 
disproportionately low sentences are handed down. There is also little engagement by the 
companies concerned in terms of accountability, although in one case study criminal 
behaviour led to the private security company losing its contract.   
 
There is limited evidence of victims having access to justice for human rights violations 
committed by the state, military, police and companies. In August 2015, President Joko 
Widodo established a ‘reconciliation commission’ to investigate past human rights abuses. 
However, the reconciliation commission is not a judicial body but a state body led by the 
Attorney General, whose office has consistently prevented human rights cases from going to 
court. It is also dominated by the military, police, intelligence agency and the Ministry of 
Politics, Law and Security.154 Disappointingly, the mandate of the commission was limited to 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, excluding torture, forced disappearances 
and extra-judicial executions. Victims of atrocities, such as the communist killings of 1965-
1966, the numerous abuses in Aceh and Papua, the violence following the East Timor 
referendum,155 and incidents during the fall of President Suharto, have yet to receive a 
remedy or even an apology from the state. The lack of progress towards an accountability 
framework for human rights violations by the military and police prompted the US and 
Australia to repeat their concerns in the UN Periodic Review working group.156 
 
Other potential avenues of redress have been ignored by the government, including the 
indictment of General Wiranto, who was chief of Indonesia’s armed forces at the time of the 
East Timor referendum violence, along with other military officials, for crimes against 
humanity by the United Nations-sponsored Special Panel for Serious Crimes of the Dili 
District Court.157 With such major atrocities remaining unaddressed, there seems little 
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prospect of the continuous lower level violence (sometimes leading to deaths), intimidation 
and abuse identified in the above research being accounted for. 
 
Furthermore, there has been little reform of military justice, as required by the second 
amendment on reform Law No. 31/1997,158 allowing military personnel to continue to enjoy 
a degree of impunity and limiting access to justice for victims. Although military courts have 
been brought under the supervision of the Supreme Court,159 reform stalled following 
opposition to limitations on the jurisdiction and authority of military courts. Currently, 
military personnel cannot be tried in civilian courts unless they have collaborated with a 
civilian when committing a crime whereupon they may be subject to joint military-civilian 
investigation.160 Military courts have jurisdiction to prosecute all crimes committed by 
military personnel but can only apply the Military Penal Code or the general Criminal Code, 
which excludes a number of criminal laws outside the Criminal Code and thereby restricts the 
criminal liability of military personnel.161 Although the Human Rights Court may assert 
jurisdiction in relation to allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity, it has no 
capacity in relation to other human rights violations.162  
 
When investigations are carried out and military personnel are found guilty under the present 
system of military justice, they tend to receive lenient sentences that fail to reflect the severity 
of the crime. For instance, six TNI personnel were sentenced to only three months in prison 
for abducting and torturing one person, killing another person and assaulting six farmers, who 
were involved in long standing land conflicts with AP.163 When eleven police officers and 
three civilians were killed during the armed confrontation between the police and military in 
Binjai because the police refused to follow military orders to release a military-backed drug 
dealer, the military prosecuted twenty low-ranked soldiers who were discharged and received 
prison sentences of only five to thirty months.164   
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In relation to remedies at the company level, companies have been able to circumvent 
mediation channels such as the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), the independent 
recourse mechanism for the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),165 and the complaint mechanism of the Round Table 
on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO).166 In one of the case studies described above, on the palm 
oil company Asiatic Persada (AP), complaints were filed to both the CAO and the RSPO by a 
coalition of NGOs concerning a land conflict with the SAD local communities.  
Wilmar, one of the largest palm oil conglomerates in the world and the owner of AP, sold the 
company in 2013 while mediation talks were still ongoing, and did so without any 
consultation. AP was sold to Prima Fortune International Ltd and PT Agro Mandiri Semesta 
(owned by the Ganda Group, an Indonesian conglomerate owned by the brother of one of the 
founders of Wilmar), which has no relationship with the IFC, nor is a member of the RSPO, 
making resolution of the conflict in favour of the victims unlikely.167 The sale of AP by 
Wilmar has effectively halted the mediation attempt with the affected communities. 
Community members and NGOs involved in the case are concerned that selling AP to ‘non-
Wilmar, non-RSPO member and non-IFC funded companies’ jeopardizes efforts to resolve 
the conflict as the new owners may not feel obliged to continue the IFC-mediated talks and 
are not bound by RSPO and IFC standards.168 
Civil cases have been filed in the US against Exxon Mobil and Freeport McMoRan under the 
US Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The International Labour Rights Fund filed the case against 
Exxon Mobil in the US Federal District Court of Columbia in June 2001 on behalf of 11 
family members of victims of human rights abuses in Aceh allegedly committed by Exxon 
Mobil’s security forces (members of the Indonesian military) during 2000 to 2001, including 
murder, torture, sexual assault, battery, kidnapping and false imprisonment. Following years 
of appeal concerning the applicability of the ATS, a US District Court ruled in 2015 that the 
claim could proceed because the plaintiffs’ claims sufficiently ‘touch and concern’ the United 
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States thereby overcoming the presumption against extraterritoriality that applies to ATS 
cases.169  
 
At present, this avenue of access to justice for victims remains open but the case is clearly 
contentious and the restriction of the ATS in the Kiobel case undermines confidence in a 
successful outcome.170 Furthermore, the dismissal of the Freeport McMoRan cases for lack of 
an actionable case, originally filed on behalf of the Amungme people of West Papua for 
allegations of human rights and environmental violations by Freeport at the Grasberg mine, 





This article has explored the erosion of the public-private distinction in the provision of 
security as it has evolved in Indonesia, demonstrating that this has happened in a very 
different way to the ideologically driven outsourcing of security found in the US and UK.  
Despite the fact that international law is based on an outmoded view of the state, it has been 
possible to identify the international legal framework of obligations applicable to Indonesia, 
especially as regards security actors operating within specific natural resources sectors. 
Although there is an upward movement in Indonesia’s ratification of key international human 
rights treaties, in contrast to its lack of active engagement with soft law instruments and 
processes, there is scant evidence of compliance by the Government of Indonesia in terms of 
implementing legislation. Furthermore, there is disturbing evidence of continuing serious 
human rights violations by Indonesian security actors both public and private.  
 
The article has considered Indonesia’s international legal responsibility for those human 
rights violations, both in terms of direct liability for actions of its police and military even 
                                                          
169 US District Court for the District of Columbia, John Doe et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation et al., No 01-
1357, Memorandum Opinion (6 July 2015).  
170 US Supreme Court, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10–1491 (17 April 2013). 
171 US District Court for the District of Louisiana, Tom Beanal on behalf of himself and all others similarly 
situated v. Freeport-McMoRan Inc and Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold, Inc, Civil Action No. 96-1474, 
969 F.Supp. 362 (10 April 1997); US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Tom Beanal on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated v. Freeport-McMoRan Inc and Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold, No. 98-
30235, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 29 November 1999); US Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Yosefa Alomang on behalf 
of himself and all others similarly situated v. Freeport-McMoRan Inc and Freeport-McMoRan Copper and 




when acting for commercial gain, and indirect liability for failing to fulfil its due diligence 
obligations to control private security actors. The article also found little compliance with 
CSR norms by the corporate sector operating in Indonesia in the extractive and natural 
resources sectors involving agricultural commodities, even as regards the more highly 
developed legal regimes applicable to private security actors, let alone prevailing business 
and human rights standards.  
 
The article considered whether any access to justice has been provided to remediate those 
violations. The evidence is that there has been very little by way remedies from either the 
state (in terms of admitting state liability or in terms of ensuring the prosecution of security 
actors committing human rights abuse while working for the corporate sector) or by the 
corporate actors themselves.  
 
In a militarised and securitised state such as Indonesia, with a high density of state security, 
militias and private security, such actors have acted in conjunction with sector businesses to 
protect assets and commodities but, in so doing, they have acted in ways to increase the 
insecurity of the local population to the extent of regularly committing violations of core 
human rights. The Indonesian Government’s human rights commitments under international 
treaties and the UN’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights need to be brought 
into domestic laws and practices regulating the activities of state and private security actors, 
and should be combined with a commitment to emerging international standards in the 
Montreux Document, the VPSHR, and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Providers.  
 
In practice this means more effective prosecution of individuals with sentences to match the 
seriousness of the crimes, greater state regulation of security actors including an effective 
independent licensing system for private security actors and an acceptance of the state’s 
responsibility for the wrongful acts of the police and military, and an increased requirement 
on companies to undertake human rights due diligence. In addition to increasing the 
recognition and implementation of state, corporate and individual legal responsibility, both 
the Indonesian Government and corporate actors should provide improved access to justice 




The direct business relationship between the two companies featured in the case studies and 
their respective security providers make these companies, as well as their parent companies 
and corporate groups, complicit in the human rights violations that have been committed, as 
well as being responsible for a failure to conduct human rights due diligence so as to prevent 
or mitigate any adverse human rights impacts that arise from the business relationship. These 
companies should ensure greater transparency in corporate ownership and management 
structures, so that the right organizations can be held accountable. Essentially, these two 
companies are responsible through their business relations for the violations committed on 
these companies’ concessions, even if they did not contribute directly them.  
 
Although violence and intimidation towards communities appear to have been an integral part 
of the two companies’ security practices, carried out by both public and private security 
providers, in limited cases only have individual personnel directly involved in violations been 
charged with these offences. It is recommended that the companies themselves are held 
responsible for their role in the violence and the human rights violations arising therefrom, 
either directly or indirectly. The buyers and financiers of these two companies are called 
upon to use their leverage, either as third-party suppliers or services providers to their supply 
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